By Ralph Martire
(Reprinted from Crain's Chicago Business)
There was much wailing and gnashing of teeth
when the recent lame-duck session in Springfield ended.
Why? No
action was taken to address the $95 billion in debt owed to the state's five
pension systems.
This leaves
the systems with just 40 percent of the funding they should have currently,
which is well below the 80 percent generally deemed healthy for public systems.
Good government groups and editorial boards
alike lamented the Legislature's failure to pass yet another proposal
to reduce that ginormous obligation - this time by cutting almost $30 billion in
benefits earned by current workers and retirees.
But rather
than being dismayed, folks should be relieved. Here's why.
A problem
really can't be solved unless the proposed solution addresses its true cause.
And the proposal that failed to pass during the lame-duck session - like every
other proposal introduced to date on this subject - focused its solution on
benefit cuts and thereby failed to deal with this particular problem's true
cause.
See, three
factors have contributed to the creation of this unfunded liability. The first
two are items inherent to the pension systems themselves, like benefit levels,
salary increases and actuarial assumptions; and investment losses suffered
during the Great Recession. But if those were the only factors creating the
unfunded liability, the systems would be around 70 percent funded today, meaning
no crisis.
The vast
majority of the unfunded liability is made up of the third contributing factor:
debt. Indeed, for more than 40 years. the state used the pension systems like a
credit card, borrowing against what it owed them to cover the cost of providing
current services, which effectively allowed constituents to consume public
services without having to pay the full cost thereof in taxes.
This
irresponsible fiscal practice became such a crutch that it was codified into law
in 1994 (P.A. 88-0593). That act implemented such aggressive borrowing against
pension contributions to fund services that it grew the unfunded liability by
more than 350 percent from 1995 to 2010 - by design. Worse, the repayment
schedule it created was so back-loaded that it resembles a ski slope, with
payments jumping at annual rates no fiscal system could accommodate. Want proof?
This year the total pension payment under the ramp is $5.1 billion - more than
$3.5 billion of which is debt service. By 2045, that annual payment is scheduled
to exceed $17 billion, with all growth being debt service.
It is this
unattainable, unaffordable repayment schedule that is straining the state's
fiscal system - not pension benefits and not losses from the Great Recession.
And no matter how much benefits are cut, that debt service will grow at
unaffordable rates. Which means decision-makers can't solve this problem without
re-amortizing the debt.
Given that the current repayment schedule is
a complete legal fiction - a creature of statute that doesn't have any actuarial
basis - making this change is relatively easy. Simply re-amortizing $85 billion
of the unfunded liability into flat, annual debt payments of around $6.9 billion
each through 2057 does the trick. After inflation, this new, flat, annual
payment structure creates a financial obligation for the state that decreases in
real terms over time, in place of the dramatically increasing structure under
current law. Moreover, because some principal would be front- rather than
back-loaded, this re-amortization would cost taxpayers $35 billion less than
current law.
One last
thing - it actually solves the problem by dealing with its cause.
No comments:
Post a Comment